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WHY DO UNIVERSITIES HAVE ENDOWMENTS?
HENRY HANSMANN*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE leading private universities in the United States commonly main-
tain large financial reserves conventionally referred to as endowments.
Harvard and Yale, for example, had endowments in 1988 of $4.2 billion
and $2.1 billion, respectively.' Although these two institutions are among
the best endowed in the nation, there are hundreds of others that also
have substantial endowments. (Table 1 gives a sample of their size and
distribution.) These endowments are now so familiar that their purpose is
seldom questioned. Yet, if we consider the matter closely, it is not obvi-
ous why they are accumulated.
The distinctive character of endowed institutions emerges strongly
when we contrast their financial behavior with that of large business
corporations. The typical business enterprise finances a substantial frac-
tion of its capital needs through borrowing. Debt currently represents
roughly one-quarter of the net worth of all companies listed on the New
* Professor of Law, Yale University. Helpful comments on earlier drafts were provided
by Fischer Black, Garry Brewer, Paul DiMaggio, John Donohue, Stephen Dresch, Robert
Ellickson, David Howarth, Estelle James, John Langbein, William Massy, Roderick
McDougall, Peter Schuck, Richard Steinberg, James Tobin, Oliver Williamson, J. Peter
Williamson, and participants in workshops at the State University of New York at Stony
Brook and Yale. The Yale University Treasurer's Office gave generous assistance in inter-
preting the university's financial records. These individuals and organizations bear no re-
sponsibility for the views presented here.
' Figures are as of June 30, 1988. Harvard also reports a figure of $4.62 billion for the
"general operating account," which comprises, in addition to funds that the university
designates as endowment, other liquid assets, such as pension reserves.
Harvard and Yale are used as examples here and elsewhere in this article simply because
they are among the nation's best-known and best-endowed institutions and because informa-
tion on their histories and finances is relatively accessible, and not because there is reason to
believe that these universities have been less thoughtful than other universities in their
endowment policies; indeed, they have probably been among the most enlightened institu-
tions in this regard.
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TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF A SAMPLE OF ENDOWMENT POOLS BY SIZE, 1985
Size (in millions) Under $25 $25-$50 $50-$100 Over $100 Total
Value (in millions)* 1,417 1,821 3,210 26,902 33,350
N ** 120 53 45 66 284
No. private 84 40 34 55 213
SouRcE -From National Association of College and University Business Officers, College and Uni-
versity Endowments: 1985 NACUBO Comparative Performance Study, tables I and 49 (1985) (hereafter
cited as NACUBO). Figures are as of June 30, 1985. Data are just for institutions that responded to the
NACUBO survey.
* Includes life income funds.
** Includes both public and private ("independent") colleges and universities. Public institutions are
excluded in the following row labelled "number private."
York Stock Exchange, and the fraction has been larger in the past.2 Large
universities, in contrast, commonly operate on capital surplus. They not
only own all their physical assets outright, unencumbered by debt,3 but
also accumulate large financial reserves in the form of endowment. There
is nothing immutable about capital financing for universities along these
lines. For example, in Japan, where private (as opposed to public) institu-
tions account for a much larger share of higher education than they do in
the United States,4 private universities are generally financed by debt.5
Published balance sheets grossly understate the value of the typical
university's physical assets and thus make it difficult to compare that
value with the size of the endowment. As an example, however, a very
crude guess might estimate the value of Yale's physical assets at roughly
2 Roger Ibbotson & Michael Gibbs, The Corporate Bond Market: Structure and Returns
(1985).
' Endowed universities do sometimes borrow: recently, for example, Harvard sold $300
million in bonds and Yale sold $90 million in bonds, in both cases to finance construction
projects. Since the amounts involved could easily have been financed with endowment
funds, such borrowing is in effect a form of tax arbitrage by which the university borrows
cheaply-the bonds are tax exempt-in order to finance endowment securities whose re-
turns to the university are also tax exempt. However, Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) §
145(b), added by the 1986 federal tax legislation, has now placed limits on such borrowing by
restricting the total amount of nonhospital tax-exempt bonds that can be issued by an
institution to $150 million.
4 As of 1986, public universities accounted for only 24 percent of college students in
Japan, the other 76 percent being enrolled in private institutions; see Japan Statistical
Yearbook 660, table 19-17 (1987). In the United States, in contrast, as of 1982, 78 percent of
college students were enrolled in public institutions, and only 22 percent in private colleges
and universities. See Statistical Abstract of the United States 114, table 185 (1987). On the
other hand, in Japan the elite institutions are public, whereas in the U.S. they are gener-
ally-with some significant exceptions-private.
' Estelle James, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective, in The Nonprofit
Sector: A Research Handbook 397, 406 (Walter Powell ed. 1987).
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the same magnitude as its endowment-about $2 billion.6 By this esti-
mate, Yale maintains net assets equal to at least twice the value of its
productive capital, and the ratio is probably similar for the other leading
endowed universities. Why would an organization follow such a policy?
This is the question addressed here. The principal focus will be on the
financial behavior of colleges and universities, where the practice of oper-
ating with a substantial endowment is familiar and well established and
where financial data are reasonably available. But the same issue arises
with other types of nonprofit organizations, including private primary and
secondary schools, hospitals, museums, and libraries. Much of the analy-
sis offered here extends to these other types of institutions as well.
I shall not offer here a single, simple theory to explain the accumulation
of endowments. Rather, I shall survey a number of possible theories and
explore their strengths and weaknesses. One motive for this inquiry is
simply to add to our positive theories of institutional form and behavior.
Another equally important motive is to provide some normative guidance.
Nonprofit institutions rarely voice any coherent policy for determining
the size of their endowments; further public discussion may help the
managers of these institutions take a more thoughtful approach to the
6 The balance sheet in Yale's annual financial report lists, among physical assets, a value
only for the university's land, buildings, and equipment, which is given as $711 million as of
June 30, 1988. This figure largely reflects historical cost (though without provision for
depreciation) and thus may be a serious underestimate of current market value. Other
assets, such as the university's extensive art, rare book, and coin collections, are omitted
from the balance sheet entirely, and indeed the university itself apparently has never sought
to establish a current value for most of these assets. Consequently, the estimate for total
physical assets offered here is no better than a wild guess. Nor is Yale in any way unique in
this respect; the value of physical assets is just as obscure at Harvard and many other
leading universities.
Any valuation of a university's physical assets must, of course, be highly problematic. A
university's physical plant is typically highly specialized and may have much lower value in
alternative uses. Consequently, values are likely to differ widely depending on whether they
are based on historical cost, replacement cost, resale value on liquidation of the university,
or productivity in their current use.
It is interesting that universities are so shy about disclosing the value of those physical
assets that are relatively easy to value, such as art and rare books, while they are generally
quite public about the value of their endowments. Several possible reasons to avoid such
disclosure come to mind. First, it might incite stronger efforts to subject the universities to
local property taxation or to extract payments from them in lieu of such taxes. Second, it
might encourage theft. Third, it might create the impression among some prospective
donors, or among government policymakers, that the universities already have sufficient
wealth.
It is even more interesting that universities such as Yale do not appraise such assets even
for purposes of internal decision making. Perhaps the most principled reasons for avoiding
such valuation are that it would be costly, that it would not be of great benefit since the
assets in question are rarely traded, and that simply having current market values in hand for
such assets would give those values excessive salience in the institution's decision making.
On the other hand, ignorance obviously has its costs.
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issue. More careful examination of the rationale for endowments may also
provide important guidance to donors in deciding whether they should
require that their gifts be added to endowment.
Similarly, closer analysis of the role of endowments can help provide
the necessary underpinning for public policy. For example, federal tax
law currently discourages the accumulation of funds by private founda-
tions by mandating that they spend annually an amount equal to at least 5
percent of their current investment asset value.7 In 1977, the Filer Com-
mission proposed that a similar rule be extended to all endowed non-
profits, including universities.8 Germany has already adopted such a pol-
icy. Until recently, endowed institutions in Germany had to pay out or
spend their total income each year, including all endowment income other
than capital gains and all gift income not specifically designated for en-
dowment. The rule was relaxed somewhat in 1985 to permit up to 25
percent of investment income to be added to capital. 9
Canada, too, has taken steps to limit endowment accumulation. In
1976, Canada passed legislation requiring that charitable organizations1"
spend annually at least 80 percent of the tax-deductible donations they
receive." The 80 percent figure was chosen on the assumption that 20
percent is a good estimate of reasonable expenses for fund-raising efforts.
Consequently, this amounted to a requirement that 100 percent of gifts be
spent currently. Since the rule initially applied to all gifts, it not only pre-
vented charities from accumulating unrestricted gift income, but it also
limited their ability to accept gifts restricted for use as endowment. In
1983, the Canadian Department of Finance proposed amendments under
which gifts restricted to endowment would be exempted from the 80-
percent spending rule, but a new rule would be imposed requiring charita-
ble organizations to spend annually at least 4.5 percent of the value of
their investment assets. 12 Ultimately, only the first of these proposals was
enacted, 13 so that Canada now effectively permits the accumulation of
restricted, but not unrestricted, gift income.
7 I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1).
8 Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (the Filer Commission), Re-
search Papers 28-30 (1977).
9 Werner Seifart, Handbuch des Stiftungsrechts 187-89 (1987).
10 Canadian tax law distinguishes between "charitable organizations," which are operat-
ing nonprofits such as universities and hospitals, and "charitable foundations," which are
very much like U.S. foundations. The discussion here applies only to the former.
"Income Tax Act § 149.1(2)(b).
12 Canadian Department of Finance, Charities and the Canadian Tax System: A Discus-
sion Paper 2-4 (1983).
"3 That is, for operating charities. Charitable foundations were subjected to the 4.5 per-
cent spending rule.
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At present, no such explicit restrictions on endowment accumulation
by universities and other operating nonprofits are actively on the legisla-
tive agenda in the United States. Nonetheless, there is a serious proposal
now before Congress' 4 for applying a 5 percent excise tax on the net
investment income of all tax-exempt organizations, including endowed
universities. 15
If we are to assess such policy measures intelligently, we must first
understand the purposes that are served by endowment accumulation.
This is also true for laws governing the enforceability of donor-imposed
restrictions. Anglo-American law has long forbidden, in general, the en-
forcement of perpetual restrictions on the use of property. An exception
has been created for gifts to charity, however, and this exception has been
broadly construed in recent years to cover restrictions on gifts made to
nonprofit corporations, such as universities, that serve charitable pur-
poses, even if the gift does not formally establish a charitable trust.
16
Thus, a restriction on a gift to a university requiring that the principal of
the gift remain intact in perpetuity-that is, that the gift be added to
endowment-is today enforceable. But this exception to the law's general
hostility to perpetual restraints is not unalterable and has long been con-
troversial.1 7 The exception should be retained, presumably, only on a
careful judgment that the purposes served by endowments are of suffi-
cient importance to justify it.
Finally, most states provide, by statute or common law, that charities
and charitable corporations (such as universities) may accumulate in-
come, whether by the direction of a donor or at the will of the trustees,
"4 Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of Possible Options to Increase
Revenues (Prepared for the Committee on Ways and Means) 275-76 (June 25, 1987); Scott
Jaschik, House Panel Eyes Plans to Tax Colleges on Some Income, Chronicle of Higher
Education A34, November 4, 1987.
1'5 In the United States, tax-exempt nonprofit corporations, including universities, are
given special exemption from the "accumulated earnings tax" applied to other corporations
by I.R.C. § 531. That tax, which is essentially a surcharge designed to discourage accumula-
tion of earnings for purposes of sheltering them from personal income taxation, is levied on
corporations that accumulate earnings "beyond the reasonable needs of the business." The
fact that accumulated earnings are being held for investment, as in the form of marketable
securities, rather than for the active conduct of the business, is an important criterion for
determining whether the tax is applicable. See Boris Bittker & James Eustice, Federal
Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 8-27 (4th ed. 1979). If the exemption
from § 531 were eliminated, there would presumably be a serious question whether univer-
sity endowments were subject to the tax.
16 St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E. 2d 305 (1939).
17 For example, Simes argued prominently in his Cooley Lectures that restrictions on the
power of trustees to expend the principal of a trust not be enforceable beyond thirty years.
See Lewis Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand (1955).
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
but only to the extent that this is reasonable or necessary to the accom-
plishment of the institution's purposes.' 8 While such doctrine has ap-
parently never been invoked to limit a university's discretion to build en-
dowment, it nevertheless arguably provides a basis for intervention if a
particular endowment accumulation appears excessive. Again, however,
we need a basis for judging when endowment accumulation is reasonable
or necessary to the accomplishment of a university's objectives.
At the risk of occasional confusion, positive and normative analysis will
be closely intertwined throughout this essay. This is not only because the
essay has the dual objectives of exploring both behavior and policy but
also because of the intrinsic nature of the subject. One important reason
universities accumulate endowments is presumably that their managers
regard this course of action as good policy.
II. THE DISCRETIONARY CHARACTER OF ENDOWMENT SAVING
When considering the behavior of endowed institutions, it is important
to clarify the term "endowment" as it refers to the financial reserves of
universities. That term suggests that the funds involved are entirely
derived from donations. It may further give rise to the impression that the
donations in question were made with the understanding that the recipient
institution would hold the principal in perpetuity, using only the income
for current expenditures. A substantial fraction of university endowments
are not, however, subject to donor-imposed restrictions. These unre-
stricted funds are commonly referred to as "quasi endowment." Accord-
ing to a broadly based survey, as of 1985 quasi endowment constituted 34
percent of the average university's total endowment and 38 percent of the
endowment funds of universities with endowments in excess of $100 mil-
lion.' 9 Moreover, universities can influence, through their solicitation
practices, the extent to which their gift income is restricted to endow-
ment. And, through their accounting practices and spending rules, univer-
sities can determine, within relatively broad bounds, whether income on
endowed funds accumulates or is spent currently. Thus a substantial por-
18 See George Bogert, Trusts § 70 (6th ed. 1987).
19 National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO), College
and University Endowments: 1986 NACUBO Comparative Performance Study, table 74
(1986). These figures may understate the portion of endowment funds that universities are
free to spend currently. A survey undertaken in the late 1960s indicated that 22 percent of
the endowment funds that the typical college or university classified as true endowment-
that is, subject to donor-imposed restrictions that prevented the expenditure of capital-
were misclassified and, in fact, were subject to no restrictions whatever. See William Cary
& Craig Bright, The Law and the Lore of Endowment Funds 10 (1969).
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tion of endowed funds have been accumulated by institutional discretion
and not donor command.
The accumulation of endowment is, in effect, a form of saving, presum-
ably for expenditure in the future.2' In a college or university, each dollar
added to endowment represents a dollar less for current research or for
educational services to current students or a dollar more in tuition that
must be charged current students in order to provide them with the same
level of services. The amounts thus saved will presumably be used to
provide more research, more education, or lower tuition in the future.
Why, then, do universities save rather than spend so much of their in-
come?
There is surprisingly little literature on this subject. To be sure, a great
deal has been written, particularly in the past two decades, on endowment
policy. 2 ' This literature, however, is confined almost exclusively to two
relatively narrow questions. The first is portfolio management-that is,
the types of securities and other assets in which a university's endowment
funds should be invested. The second is the appropriate spending rule-
that is, the amount of the annual return on the endowment that should be
spent for the university's current operations, rather than accumulated. It
might seem that the latter issue is necessarily tied to the broader questions
of why, in general, the endowment is being maintained, how large it ought
to be, and whether and how fast it should accumulate. Spending rules are
rarely addressed in this broad framework, however. Rather, nearly all
discussions of spending rules simply take it for granted that the rate of
20 Since these institutions are nonprofit, they are constrained by the terms of their corpo-
rate charters ultimately to spend all of their income for the purposes for which they were
formed. Thus a college or university presumably must, sooner or later, spend all of its
income on education and research.
21 See, for example, Advisory Committee on Endowment Management, Managing Educa-
tional Endowments: Report to the Ford Foundation (1969); Fischer Black, The Investment
Policy Spectrum: Individuals, Endowment Funds and Pension Funds, 32 Fin. Analysts J. 23
(January/February 1976); Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. eds., Managing Endowment
Capital (1969); Richard Ennis & J. Peter Williamson, Spending Policy for Educational En-
dowments (1976); Robert Eisner, Endowment Income, Capital Gains and Inflation Account-
ing: Discussion, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. 438-41 (1974); Richard Grinold, David Hopkins, &
William E. Massy, A Model for Long-Range University Budget Planning under Uncertainty,
9 Bell J. Econ. 396 (1978); James M. Litvack, Burton G. Malkiel, & Richard E. Quandt, A
Plan for the Definition of Endowment Income, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. 433 (1974); Burton G.
Malkiel & Paul Firstenberg, Managing Risk in an Uncertain Era: An Analysis for Endowed
Institutions (1976); Donald A. Nichols, The Investment Income Formula of the American
Economic Association, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. 420 (1974); James Tobin, What Is Permanent
Endowment Income? 64 Am. Econ. Rev. 427 (1974); J. Peter Williamson, Background
Paper, in Funds for the Future (Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on College and Univer-
sity Endowment Policy 1975).
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spending out of endowment should not, over time, exceed the real rate of
return on the investments constituting the endowment. Debate has largely
been confined to narrow questions concerning the proper definition of
endowment income.
I should emphasize that I am not bringing into question here the heavy
reliance of universities on private donations. There are a number of rea-
sons why these donations are necessary and appropriate for financing
higher education. 22 Nor do I mean to suggest that elite universities cur-
rently receive private donations in excessive amounts; indeed, the re-
verse is probably the case. Rather, my sole concern here is with the
entirely separable question of why gift income, or any form of income, is
accumulated in the form of endowment rather than being spent more or
less currently.
III. PRESENT SPENDING RULES
Most major universities today employ an endowment spending rule that
calls for spending an amount roughly equal to the real rate of return on the
endowment, including both cash income and capital gains. Yale is typical.
By that university's calculation, the average long-run real rate of return
on Yale's endowment investments has historically been roughly 4.5 per-
cent. Consequently, Yale has adopted a policy whereby the university
will annually spend from its endowment an amount equal to 4.5 percent of
its current value. (To avoid large annual shifts in the amount spent as the
securities markets fluctuate, Yale's spending rule actually calls for spend-
ing an amount equal to 70 percent of the amount spent in the previous
year plus 30 percent of 4.5 percent of the current market value of the
endowment.) This rule is designed to help assure that, over the long run,
the real value of the endowment will not decrease. In fact, like other
universities, Yale generally adds new funds to its endowment each year.
Thus, in practice, such a spending rule tends to cause the real value of the
endowment to increase over time.
For the sake of illustration, Table 2 gives figures (in constant 1967
dollars) for Yale's endowment and budget for the years 1920-85. Column
22 Owing to problems of moral hazard, and to legal restraints on involuntary servitude,
students cannot borrow against their future income in amounts sufficient to finance the
amount of education that is efficient for them to consume. Consequently, higher education
would generally be underconsumed in the absence of adequate private or public grants.
Moreover, private and public grants to educational institutions are necessary to fund the
production of public goods, such as scholarly research. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role
of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L. J. 835, 859-62 (1980); Henry Hansmann, Economic
Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in Powell, ed., supra note 5, at 36.
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2 gives the value of the endowment fund; column 3 gives the amount of
new income added to the endowment; column 4 gives the cash income
received from endowment investments; and column 5 gives the amounts
expended from the endowment. Columns 6 and 7 give, in dollar and
percentage terms, respectively, the net expenditure from the endowment,
computed as amounts withdrawn less new amounts added to the fund;
negative figures indicate that more was added to the endowment than was
withdrawn from it during the year in question. As column 7 shows, the
level of net expenditure has fluctuated considerably, though in all but one
of the sixty-six years covered by the table it has been well below the 4.5
percent figure that the university computes as its long-run rate of return
on the endowment.
23
Some universities employ an even more conservative spending policy
than Yale's, spending at most only those amounts actually received as
cash income from the endowment (that is, interest and dividends) and
leaving capital gains to accumulate.2 4 Such a rule, which in practice tends
to increase the real value of the endowment over time even without the
addition of further funds, was the common practice among universities
until the late 1960s, when more liberal spending rules like Yale's began to
be adopted. Since that time, debate about endowment spending policy has
focused almost exclusively on whether it is wiser to adopt one or the other
of these two approaches or something in between.25
23 Many universities, Yale included, list additions to endowment as expenditures on their
annual accounts, while they list transfers from endowment to the operating budget (such as
endowment income that is spent annually) as income. By this means, the annual budget can
(and frequently does) appear perfectly balanced even when the university's total income
substantially exceeds (or falls far short of) its expenditures. For example, Yale's annual
financial reports show that its annual budget balanced perfectly to the fourth significant digit
in each of the years 1980-85 even though, as Table 2 shows, many millions of dollars were
added to the university's endowment during each of those years (and the market value of the
endowment itself increased substantially owing to a rising stock market).
It is for this reason, among others, that current university financial reports are often
uninformative and indeed misleading. For a critique of current university accounting stan-
dards and some suggestions for reform, see Harold Bierman & Thomas Hofstedt, University
Accounting (Alternative Measures of Ivy League Deficits), Non-profit Report 14 (May
1973).
24 See Williamson, supra note 21.
25 As an indication of typical practice, in 1984-85, out of 203 private colleges and univer-
sities surveyed, the average institution spent an amount equal to 6.6 percent of the market
value of its endowment, while the median institution spent an amount equal to 6.1 percent of
market value. (These figures presumably do not reflect amounts added to endowment during
the year and thus overstate the net rate of spending.) Among these institutions, 155 reported
using a spending formula. At eighty-two of these institutions, the formula used was a
straightforward percentage-of-market-value formula of the type used by Yale. See









O0 =I~ - "i N- O7 0 N r- Wn m W -000C,0 'n 00 w 0n C " rI "Nf 'o~ " t'n
I4 E- I-"" ,I -r ,0 D t;,
en C4 0 -0 a, O s O w 00 N -N , N N '0 O N- '0 '0 N- N- N- N 00w
C-0 4 In eq - 00. r- N- N 4 (0n 'D- W) r- NN 000 o- m 0000 0
V- c 'en~' 000' - ON ON 00- N, ON 00 (2~ N '0 en -00 ON, N- N e
7- 7~ n' 0 ne N( 0e -e l~~-e en ' n
(1e en m 'ItItI ~-I In ' , / 000 00 ON, 00 00 00 N- 0\ 00 ON 00 00 N- N- N- N'0'0'0
-mn 00 00 '0 N- ON m 'o 0 -00 (2 00 mn V, en o C1 t--(i 00 C4 cq - 1
'D 0 ' en 00 00 ' D00 en en 04 en No 00 'D :; 'r) - 00- r- N o en a,('0O
en "ts '0 'N N 0000 21 n L1 "n r4 en en 4 . .~ .~' -000O
I-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
- ~ ' 5 a, w '01( t 0- m%~0 0~0~'0 ~ %~ 0' 0
(1m. . MM,*. mmm
r- 0% 04 N, r- N' mf C7 'D N '0 - 0T D t- -o 0, 0 N000 'o .. I 00 C 0' 00 'n~
'00~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (5 C4 A Nm( 1r %( 0 00 '0 0' 0 %00'l(0
09 0 nn -I ((100 r 0 Nl ( 'l 00 ' '00 '0( N 0 R 0% 't 00 In 0 R Cl n N .- '00
m mI "1 7 Iq , -m m m mw)m e ' qr
In Io I- I- w w w a, --4" ' -m m
cqr 4c qC4r 4L
0t 0~N -r- 'D N4 N- 00 N (1 , 00 C4 0%, a, (10 r- Nr Nc 'D fO mO
0% m '00 N 00 N :t -c C 0% 0 N N) 0% 0 0 -0 00 m (W10%C m g1 N 2 0 0 T (1 00 a, (0
N 0 m It 0 %0 r- 00 - N 00( m 000 'D 00 C1 m~ It In fl N- 0000 N - '0 " I'l
W) n ) n ) ) ' ) o % ' 0 '0 '0 0 No'0'0NNN NNNN N00000 OD00 00 0
ON (7N 0% as0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
IV. INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
The rare efforts to offer a principled justification for the preservation or
accumulation of university endowments commonly appeal to notions of
intergenerational equity.26 The following quotation from Tobin27 is among
the most explicit descriptions of this rationale:
The trustees of an endowed institution are the guardians of the future against
the claims of the present. Their task is to preserve equity among generations. The
trustees of an endowed university.., assume the institution to be immortal. They
want to know, therefore, the rate of consumption from endowment which can be
sustained indefinitely .... In formal terms, the trustees are supposed to have a
zero subjective rate of time preference.
Consuming endowment income so defined means in principle that the existing
endowment can continue to support the same set of activities that it is now
supporting. This rule says that current consumption should not benefit from the
prospects of future gifts to endowment. Sustainable consumption rises to encom-
pass an enlarged scope of activities when, but not before, capital gifts enlarge the
endowment.
Under close scrutiny, however, concerns for intergenerational equity
provide very doubtful support for current endowment policies.
28
A. Not Equity, but Efficiency
To begin with, the types of wealth transfers accomplished by endow-
ment accumulation run strongly counter to prevailing notions of equity.
There is every reason to believe that, over the long run, the economy will
continue to grow in the future as it has in the past and that future genera-
tions of students will therefore be, on average, more prosperous than
students are today, just as today's students are more prosperous than
their predecessors. Thus, equity does not call for a transfer of wealth,
through saving, from the present generation to later ones. On the con-
trary, it would seem more equitable to have future generations subsidize
the present. This could be accomplished by having universities borrow,
rather than save, and then repay the debt by increasing tuition in the
future. To be sure, a university might reasonably choose not to incur
substantial negative net worth by borrowing amounts considerably in
excess of the value of its assets. Competition among universities might
26 See, for example, David Hopkins & William Massy, Planning Models for Colleges and
Universities 172 (1981).
27 Tobin, supra note 21, at 427.
28 Note that Tobin, in the quotation above, is offering an interpretation of the views of
university trustees and does not clearly commit himself to an endorsement of the policy he
describes. The perspective of trustees will be discussed in more detail below.
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prevent a university from ever raising its tuition to the point where it
would run at a profit and thus pay off the debt since then students might
choose to attend other (perhaps more newly founded) universities that
charged tuition more in line with current costs. Consequently, feasible
endowment policies may in practice be bounded on the lower end by a
policy that involves, at minimum, zero net worth for the university-that
is, a policy under which no net financial reserves are maintained and all
assets are mortgaged to the limit of their value.
There could still be a case for transferring wealth to future generations
through endowment accumulation, however, if the rate of return on en-
dowment investments is substantially higher than the rate of growth of per
capita income. In that case, the marginal gain in utility to the beneficiaries
in future generations could exceed the marginal utility loss to the current
generation, even though the transfer would be from the poor to the rich.
This might be a desirable result if the university's objective is to maximize
the undiscounted sum of its students' utilities across generations. In fact,
university endowments have earned a long-run real rate of return that has
averaged around 4 percent over the past sixty years, while growth in per
capita real gross national product (GNP) in the United States has av-
eraged only around 2 percent. 29 In any event, this argument for endow-
ment accumulation is based on intergenerational efficiency, not equity. In
fact, it is a persuasive rationale only if the resulting efficiency gains are
thought sufficient to outweigh the adverse consequences of endowment
accumulation for intergenerational equity. Moreover, the intergenera-
tional efficiency argument is itself subject to serious objections.
B. Some Problems of Programming
To begin with, maximization of welfare across generations of students
by means of endowment saving and spending involves a complicated
problem of programming. Even if we assume a zero rate of discount (that
is, even if we give the utility of future generations of students the same
weight we give the utility of the present generation in our decision mak-
ing), and even if we ignore the possibility of additional future gifts to
endowment, it is only in extraordinarily special cases that the correct
solution to this programming problem calls for constant annual payouts
29 Yale estimates the average real rate of return on its own endowment over this period as
4.5 percent. The average rate of growth of real GNP per capita was 1.7 percent for the period
1929-85. See Economic Report of the President 254, 287 (1986).
Arguably, the correct comparison is, instead, between (1) the real rate of return on the
endowment minus the annual growth rate of the student population and (2) the growth rate of
per capita income. Since most universities have increased their enrollments over time, this
makes the case for endowment accumulation less attractive.
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from existing endowment funds as suggested by Tobin. Indeed, under
many reasonable models of the problem, there are no situations that
justify a policy of constant annual payouts (that is, spending annually the
real return on the endowment). The Appendix contains a simple mathe-
matical illustration.
By increasing the realism of our assumptions we can identify other
reasons why it is unwise for a university to engage in substantial saving
even if intergenerational welfare maximization is the primary goal. To
begin with, contrary to the conventional wisdom as described by Tobin
above, there is no reason to ignore the prospect of future gifts to endow-
ment in undertaking an intergenerational welfare analysis. If future gift
income, like future tuition income, is reasonably foreseeable, then it
should be included in any intertemporal budget plan. Ignoring it is little
better than ignoring future tuition income or future faculty salaries. The
larger the future gift income, the more reason to spend, not save, current
gift income. (See the Appendix.)
Moreover, there is necessarily some risk associated with saving funds
for expenditure in the future. While the productivity of a given univer-
sity's expenditures may remain the same or increase with time, it may
also decrease substantially. Demand for the university's services may fall
owing to demographic shifts, increased competition from other institu-
tions, or secular decline within the institution itself. Or, more generally,
changes in educational technology may make other forms of instruction
more effective. Such risk provides an additional reason to apply a positive
discount rate to expenditures out of a university's endowment, even if we
do not discount future utilities. 30 And this throws even further doubt on an
endowment policy that transfers substantial wealth from the present gen-
eration to the future.
The most sophisticated efforts at developing programming models for
university financial planning, namely those of Grinold, Hopkins, and
Massy, 31 do not confront these issues of efficiency and equity directly
because they do not (unlike the very simple model in the Appendix) seek
to maximize an intergenerational welfare function that values the univer-
sity's ultimate outputs (education and research, for example). Rather, in
their operational form, these models focus principally on the feasibility
and consistency of alternative financial goals, such as maintaining the
ratio of student aid to tuition at 0.1 or maintaining the ratio of total
expenses to endowment at 0.5. Although these authors do suggest some
30 This point has been made before in Eisner, supra note 21. See the Appendix for
illustration.
" Grinold, Hopkins, & Massy, supra note 21; Hopkins & Massy, supra note 26.
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substantive goals for endowment policy, those goals are not derived from
the formal models but are only briefly and unsystematically defended. In
particular, they suggest a policy under which the payout from the endow-
ment will cover a constant (or perhaps even an increasing) share of total
university expenses in every future year, 32 though they do not state what
that share should be or how it should be determined. They justify this
approach principally on the basis of the increasing real costs faced by
universities,33 a consideration to which we now turn.
C. Increasing Costs
A common variant of the intergenerational equity argument invokes the
increasing cost of education for succeeding generations. The real cost of a
university education may well rise in the future, as it has in the past, since
there is little increase in productivity in education relative to other goods.
Thus, if the value of a university's endowment were held constant, the
income from that endowment would finance an ever-decreasing fraction
of the cost of education. As a consequence, it is argued, the real value of
the endowment should be increased over time (by spending less currently)
so that the amount of real income spent from the endowment each year
will rise at a rate at least sufficient to constitute a constant fraction of the
cost of education.34
If the demand for education, both now and in the future, were com-
pletely inelastic, then a higher rate of growth in costs would make the case
for building an endowment stronger in terms of an intergenerational wel-
fare calculation.3 5 Even then, it would by no means follow that the appro-
priate rule would be to maintain endowment income as a constant fraction
of the cost of education. Moreover, and more important, if (as is obvi-
ously true) demand is not completely inelastic-that is, if the amount of
education consumed at a university is a choice variable for consumers in
terms of either quality or quantity-then countervailing efficiency consid-
erations argue strongly against saving more when the cost of education
is rising. If education in future generations will be costlier than it is at
present, then there is no reason to consume less of it today in order to
consume more of it in the future. This would simply be substituting a
more expensive good for a cheaper one. Taxing education through en-
dowment accumulation in the present in order to subsidize it in the future
32 See Hopkins & Massy, supra note 26, at 173, 184.
33 See id. at 180-84.
34 Id.; Ennis & Williamson, supra note 21, at 20; Williamson, supra note 21; Frederick E.
Balderston, Managing Today's University 260-61 (1974).
35 See the Appendix.
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only distorts consumption of education both within and across genera-
tions, leading us to consume too little of it today and too much tomorrow.
D. Institutional Competence
To the foregoing considerations we must add the problem of institu-
tional competence. Even if the society's overall savings rate appears for
some reason inappropriately low, there seems little reason for a university
to take on itself the task of rectifying the situation. Transferring wealth
from one generation to another is quite different from creating and dis-
seminating knowledge, which is presumably a university's primary pur-
pose and area of expertise. Moreover, the university can, in general, only
transfer wealth among generations of its own students; it cannot other-
wise affect the overall distribution of wealth in the society at large. While
it may make sense for the national government to employ monetary and
fiscal policy to change the social savings rate and to redistribute wealth
across generations, such a goal is much more problematic for a private
institution.
Moreover, any funds saved for intergenerational transfers could alter-
natively be used to promote intragenerational equity by providing greater
financial aid today to indigent students. Since intragenerational equity is
a much simpler and less controversial goal than intergenerational effi-
ciency, why not make it the primary focus of the redistributive efforts of
universities?
E. What Form of Investments?
There is one last point. Even if a university wants to help future genera-
tions, financial investments may not be the best means to that end. Most
university activities involve some form of investment for the future. The
research a university undertakes today, the education it provides, the
faculty it builds, and the physical facilities it constructs will all yield a
return decades or even generations in the future. Accumulating funds in
an endowment is worthwhile only if the return to endowment investments
exceeds the return from these other activities. Or, put differently, when a
university adds a dollar to its endowment for the purpose of making an
intergenerational transfer, it is implicitly making the judgment that the
dollar will have a higher rate of return if invested in stocks and bonds than
in educating an undergraduate, or doing research in biophysics, or adding
books to the library.
In sum, although intergenerational equity is the objective most com-
monly offered to justify university endowment policies, it is a singularly
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weak justification. If endowment accumulation is rational, then presum-
ably it must serve some other purpose. Of course, it is possible that
endowment accumulation is not rational. Even if pursuit of intergenera-
tional equity is not a convincing argument for endowment accumulation,
universities may act as though it is simply because they have not thought
the issue through carefully. Consequently, the failure of this argument as
a normative justification does not necessarily imply its irrelevance as a
positive explanation.
V. LUMPY FUNDING
A related, but more prosaic, justification for endowment accumulation
might be that donations to a university are often lumpy. Sometimes a
founder or other major benefactor makes a single large donation that
represents a substantial fraction of the total gift income the university can
expect to receive in the near future. Similarly, economies of scale and
scope in fund-raising may make it efficient to mount large campaigns for
donations at substantial intervals rather than to seek to maintain a steady
flow of smaller gifts. In such cases, it may be most efficient to spend the
income over a period of years, rather than immediately on receipt, and
thus keep the university's annual expenditures on a reasonably stable
path. This concern at least provides a justification for holding and invest-
ing funds over moderate periods of time-long enough to smooth out
expenditures. But the argument does not generally provide a justification
for holding funds as permanent endowment, and it does not apply at all to
the numerous small gifts that, in the aggregate, have a value that is rela-
tively constant and predictable from year to year.
These considerations of lumpy income, moreover, probably offered a
much stronger rationale for holding funds as endowment in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries than they do today. In those earlier times,
universities more commonly received very large personal bequests and
did not engage in fund-raising on as continuous a basis as is common
today. 36 More particularly, these considerations do not justify the com-
mon contemporary practice of regularly diverting a portion of general
unrestricted gift income to the endowment.
36 The figures for Yale's endowment in Table 2 reflect this fact. The huge increase in the
size of Yale's endowment in the 1920s and 1930s was in large part the result of gifts from just
two important donors (Sterling and Harkness) and a single fund-raising campaign in 1926-27
(the pledges from which were paid in over the following years). See George Pierson, Yale:
The University College 1921-1937 (1955); Brooks Kelly, Yale: A History (1974).
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VI. TAX INCENTIVES
Nonprofit universities are exempt from the corporate income tax. As a
consequence, their return on invested capital is higher than the return to
taxable personal or corporate investments.
There are two ways in which this exemption might affect a university's
savings policy. The first, and most obvious, is by altering the university's
trade-off between the costs of present and future production. The second
is by encouraging explicit or implicit contracts between the university and
potential donors.
To understand the latter incentive, suppose, for example, that a given
graduate wishes to bequeath a certain amount to her alma mater when she
dies. Putting aside questions of risk bearing, it would then be advanta-
geous for her instead to contribute now an amount equal to the present
value (at the after-tax interest rates available to her) of the amount of the
bequest she plans to make, on the condition that the university not spend
the gift currently but, rather, invest it and accumulate the returns and then
spend the entire accumulated amount on her death. This strategy will
yield a greater benefit to the university at no increase in cost to the donor
since the university can invest the funds at a higher after-tax rate than she
can. Some portion of a university's general endowment accumulation
might be seen as part of an implicit contract of this sort.
These tax incentives may well have contributed to the tendency of
universities to accumulate endowments. There are, however, several rea-
sons to believe that tax considerations alone cannot explain endowment
accumulation.
First, business corporations are entitled to deduct 80 percent of inter-
corporate dividends when computing their corporate income tax, and this
eliminates some of the disparity between universities and business corpo-
rations in the returns to investing in stocks.3 7
Second, since the tax exemption increases wealth for the university in
every year, it has an income effect that may offset the increased incentive
for saving that comes from the substitution effect of a higher rate of
return: less money need be set aside currently in order to provide a given
amount of income in the future. Thus, the mere fact that the return to
37 I.R.C. § 243. The benefits of this provision are to some extent limited by I.R.C. § 531,
which imposes an "accumulated earnings tax" on accumulations of earnings beyond the
reasonable needs of the business. See note 15 supra. Whether the latter tax, which is mostly
applied to closely held firms, would be applied to a publicly held corporation that built up
substantial reserves is unclear. See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 15, at 8-6 to 8-8 (4th ed.
1979).
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savings is higher than it would otherwise be for a university does not
necessarily mean that the university will-or should-save more. To de-
termine this, one must know the university's objective function-that is,
what it is saving for.
Third, as a historical point, universities such as Harvard and Yale
began accumulating substantial endowments by the middle of the nine-
teenth century, long before either the corporate or the personal income
tax was in effect.
Of course, just because the tax exemption for endowment income does
not appear to have been the principle motivation for endowment accumu-
lation does not mean that the exemption has not had an effect at the
margin on the size of university endowments. Nor does it mean that it is
good policy to continue to exempt endowment income from taxation. If
universities have a tendency to accumulate inefficiently large endow-
ments, then a tax regime less favorable to endowment accumulation may
be appropriate.
VII. MAINTAINING LIQUIDITY
Another possible reason for maintaining a large endowment is to have a
reserve against financial reversals. Income may fall suddenly for various
reasons: the number of qualified admissions applicants who can afford full
tuition may drop because of demographic changes or economic recession;
private contributions may decline because of a change in the tax laws or
an unfavorable reaction by the alumni to the institution's policies; federal
grants for education and research may be cut after a change in administra-
tions. Expenses may also rise dramatically; the energy shock of the early
1970s is just one obvious example. With a substantial accumulated sur-
plus in hand, these financial reversals can be ridden out with a minimum
amount of internal disruption.
A. Are Universities Particularly Vulnerable to Financial Shocks?
To be sure, financial reversals affect business firms as well. Yet busi-
ness firms generally do not maintain large financial reserves as a conse-
quence. If the need for liquidity explains endowment accumulation, there-
fore, it must be because nonprofit educational institutions are much more
vulnerable to temporary financial shocks than ordinary business firms.
This could, however, be the case. For one thing, a university may be
much less able than a business firm to rely on borrowing as a means of
riding out hard times since a university's assets are usually highly organi-
zation specific and thus provide poor collateral. Moreover, a business
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firm can, in extremis, seek new equity capital when its current financial
situation is tight but its future holds out hope. A nonprofit firm, in con-
trast, does not have the option of selling equity. Finally, educational
institutions have only limited flexibility in adjusting their scale of opera-
tions on a short-term basis. A large proportion of faculty have lifetime
tenure, and thus they, and the other personnel that support them, cannot
simply be laid off when finances are tight. Students, in turn, are admitted
for degree programs that typically last four years and must be serviced for
that period.
B. How Much Security Do Endowments Provide?
Existing endowments at many universities are large enough to serve as
substantial financial buffers. Of a sample of 206 of the nation's better-
endowed private colleges (a subset of those included in Table 1), the
average institution had an endowment twice as large as its current operat-
ing budget, and four institutions had endowments more than 7.5 times as
large as their current budgets.38 To illustrate the amount of security that
such endowments might provide, let us again take Yale as an example and
ask about the consequences of a total cutoff of federal government fund-
ing. At present, direct and indirect federal government support to Yale (in
the form of grants, contracts, and student aid) is roughly one-quarter of
the university's operating budget. (See Table 3.) Yale's endowment,
which in 1986 was 4.4 times the size of its budget, could serve as a
complete substitute for this support, thus keeping the size of the total
budget unaffected by a cutoff of federal funds, for a period of twenty
years before the endowment would be completely depleted. 39 Even at the
end of this twenty years, the university would still retain all of its physical
assets, with their value unaffected and presumably available, at least in
part, as security for loans to carry the university through yet further
periods of adversity. Alternatively, if we assume that only the unre-
stricted portion of the endowment is available to be spent, then Yale
could operate for about eight years before it would have to cut back the
programs that were previously funded by government or find other
sources of support for those programs.
3" NACUBO, 1986, supra note 19, at 94.
" This computation assumes that, over the twenty years, the endowment will be drawn
on not only to make up the 25 percent of the budget that would otherwise come from federal
funds but also to provide the 8.3 percent of the budget that has, on net, been drawn from the
endowment annually on average over the past twenty years (which is the average of col. 10
of Table 2 for the period 1966-85). Thus, endowment would be drawn on for a total of one-
third of the budget annually.
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TABLE 3
RELATIONSHIP OF ENDOWMENT TO NONGOVERNMENTAL BUDGET AT YALE, 1964-85
Non- Col. 3
Government Income governmental as % of
Year as % of Budget Budget* Endowment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1964 32.7 37.8 10.5
1965 33.4 40.2 10.6
1966 34.7 52.5 12.9
1967 36.6 56.5 13.8
1968 37.8 59.0 12.7
1969 36.3 64.2 13.5
1970 32.8 72.1 16.9
1971 29.8 74.9 17.0
1972 30.0 76.3 17.6
1973 30.1 76.1 18.0
1974 27.3 77.5 21.5
1975 26.2 78.5 24.7
1976 25.1 83.5 25.0
1977 24.9 86.6 27.9
1978 25.9 82.9 29.7
1979 24.9 82.3 30.6
1980 24.9 81.1 29.6
1981 30.8 76.2 26.0
1982 28.9 82.3 31.9
1983 27.6 88.6 23.8
1984 26.1 94.9 27.6
1985 26.3 99.4 24.3
Figures in millions of 1967 dollars.
C. Some Inconsistencies
There are, however, good reasons to doubt that most universities have
accumulated endowments principally for smoothing out annual income
flows or sustaining liquidity during periods of temporary financial strin-
gency.
For one thing, the major source of cost inflexibility that most distin-
guishes universities from for-profit firms and from other types of non-
profits-namely, academic tenure-developed only in the twentieth cen-
tury. Yet endowments played a more important role in the finances of
universities in the nineteenth century than they do now. In addition, it is
generally recognized that financial distress may be justification for abro-
gation of tenure.
Moreover, the spending rules currently popular among universities,
which call for spending a given fraction of the real value of the endow-
ment annually, are directly inconsistent with a policy of using the endow-
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ment as a financial buffer. Such a rule commits an institution to using its
operating budget as a buffer to absorb shocks to the market value of its
endowment, rather than vice versa. The same conclusion holds for the
spending rules of earlier decades, which spent annually only cash income
and not capital gains.
To be sure, current spending rules may be simply fair-weather expe-
dients, to be adhered to only so long as times are flush. In fact, univer-
sities that currently employ such rules have in recent years commonly
been adding new funds to their endowments each year, so that the nomi-
nal spending rule overstates the rate of endowment spending. For most
universities, the present is therefore actually a time of endowment ac-
cumulation. When times get more difficult, the new additions to endow-
ment will likely be reduced or eliminated, hence effectively increasing the
spending rate. And if a crisis comes, universities may be prepared to
abandon their spending rules altogether and actually reduce their endow-
ments.
Has this, in fact, been the long-term behavioral pattern for most univer-
sities? It is not easy to tell. Reliable and consistent historical data on uni-
versity finances are not readily available. Moreover, a variety of compli-
cations make the historical record difficult to interpret.
Yale's experience in recent decades offers an illustration. From column
7 of Table 2 we see that there have been years, principally in the 1920s and
1930s, in which substantial amounts have been added to the endowment
on net. There have not, however, been any corresponding periods of
substantial dissaving. In only one year, 1975, did the net spending rate
exceed the figure of 4.5 percent that the university estimates as the long-
run rate of return on its endowment, and only in two years did it exceed
3.5 percent. This pattern seems inconsistent with the hypothesis that the
endowment has been used as a financial buffer.
In particular, Yale did not withdraw substantial funds from its endow-
ment to help it through the financial crisis of the 1970s. During that decade
Yale, like most universities, found itself suddenly in straitened circum-
stances: private demand declined, government support abruptly stopped
its former upward trajectory, and energy costs increased dramatically.
These difficulties are reflected in the budget figures in column 8 of Table 2:
after two decades of substantial and uninterrupted growth, Yale's budget
remained roughly constant in real terms from 1970 to 1980, in spite of
increases in the real costs of some important inputs, such as energy.
These circumstances would seem to call for drawing on endowment. Yet
the average net endowment spending rate from 1971-80 was only 2.21
percent-slightly higher than the average rate of 1.28 percent from 1961-
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70, roughly equal to the average rate of 2.15 percent from 1963-70, and
lower than the 3.40 percent average rate of 1967-70.
One might conclude from this record that Yale does not maintain an
endowment in large part, or even in significant part, to help cushion the
university from the effects of financial shocks. There are, however, other
circumstances that make the experience of the 1970s difficult to interpret.
D. The Experience of the 1970s
In the late 1960s many universities (with Yale among the vanguard)
began to revise their traditionally conservative policies for endowment
management in two important respects. First, they abandoned the prac-
tice of investing largely in bonds and high-dividend stocks and began to
invest instead in growth stocks-that is, stocks that paid small dividends
and were relatively risky but held the promise of high expected growth in
market price. Second, they abandoned the practice of spending only out
of cash income (that is, dividends and interest received) and adopted the
"total return" approach to endowment spending, whereby some portion
of capital gains is also considered part of endowment income and thus
available to be realized and spent currently. These changes were spurred
by a stock market in its second decade of sustained growth, by the need to
finance the substantial programs of expansion on which many universities
had embarked, and by the active leadership of the Ford Foundation.4 °
Then, just as universities suddenly started to feel other financial pres-
sures in the early 1970s, the stock market began a decade of retreat. The
real value of many university endowments fell drastically. 4 1 This experi-
ence is reflected in column 2 of Table 2: the real value of Yale's endow-
ment peaked in 1969; it then fell more or less continuously until 1982,
when it had only 54 percent of its 1969 value. The 1970s were therefore an
unattractive time in which to liquidate a portion of the remaining capital
value of university endowments in order to support operating budgets.
Indeed, there seems to have been a feeling that the liberal endowment
spending practices of the late 1960s were in part responsible for the
difficulties in which the universities found themselves. If the universities
See Advisory Committee on Endowment Management, supra note 21; Cary & Bright,
supra note 19.
4" If we sum the endowments of the eight Ivy League schools plus Chicago and Stanford,
the total, in constant (1967) dollars, drops precipitously from $3.16 billion in 1971-72 to
$2.20 billion in 1973-74, then oscillates around roughly that level until 1979-80, when it
reaches a low of $2.08 billion, after which it increases relatively steadily, reaching $3.90
billion in 1985-86. (Data from Council for Financial Aid to Education, Voluntary Support of
Education Report.)
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had been more conservative then, they would not have become com-
mitted to such large budgets and would have had larger endowments to
tide themselves over when things got bad.
Thus, the hard times of the early 1970s seem to have reinforced an
attitude of conservatism in the management of university endowments
that has persisted into the present.42 The liberal endowment management
strategies that became popular in the late 1960s-investment in growth
stocks and a willingness to include capital gains as part of spendable
endowment income-were not repudiated, and by now they have become
common practice. 43 But, as we have seen, many universities today em-
ploy a spending formula that confines spendable endowment income to
the real rate of return, thus apparently ruling out any effort to liquidate
and spend a portion of the endowment's capital value.
It is possible that, if the stock market had remained firm in the 1970s,
universities would have exhibited much greater willingness to spend out
of endowment capital to support their badly strained operating budgets.
Thus, the most we can conclude from the record is that there is little
affirmative evidence that universities have viewed their endowments prin-
cipally as buffers for their operating budgets, even during the severe
financial crisis of recent years.
This is not to deny that endowments are used as financial buffers in a
limited degree. It is apparent from Table 2, for example, that Yale has
used flows to and from its endowment to smooth out its annual budget,
withdrawing from the endowment on net in some years and adding to it in
others. But the amount of capital that Yale, and many other universities,
maintain in their endowments is far larger than necessary to manage the
relatively modest transactions of this type that are undertaken from year
to year.
VIII. LONG-TERM SECURITY
It may be, however, that university endowments are maintained to
serve as insurance, not against relatively short-term swings in financial
conditions, but rather against the demise of the institution as a whole even
when it faces adverse circumstances for long periods of time-that is,
over decades, or even generations. If an ordinary business firm were to
42 Although the conventional wisdom seems to be that the decade of the 1970s as a whole
was extremely bad for higher education, it has been argued that, objectively viewed, that
decade was in fact an exceptionally good one overall-perhaps the best in the nation's
history except for the 1960s. See Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education,
Three Thousand Futures: The Next Twenty Years for Higher Education 10-14 (1980).
43 NACUBO, 1986, supra note 19, at 2.
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sustain repeated losses over many years, it would probably be efficient for
the firm to go out of business-and inefficient for the firm to draw on all of
its retained earnings from earlier decades to cover its losses. But there
might be good reasons for a university to seek to insure that it can survive
even rather long periods of financial adversity.
A. Preserving Reputational Capital
To begin with, a university's alumni have an interest in having their
alma mater continue to prosper long after they graduate. The survival and
quality of the university serve as a continuing signal of the quality and
character of its graduates; for the university to decline or disappear might
affect their reputations or self-image. Further, for some alumni a univer-
sity continues to be a focal point for socializing with one's fellow gradu-
ates and for making useful social and business contacts with more recent
graduates.
These interests may help explain why alumni continue to contribute to
a university long after they graduate. 44 More to the point here, they help
explain why it is that a prospective university student might prefer to
attend an institution with a large endowment. The student is making a
substantial commitment by choosing a given university: she is investing in
a relationship that will continue to bear fruit over the rest of her life. The
value of that investment will be diminished if the university should disap-
pear, or even suffer a conspicuous decline in quality. A large endowment
offers some assurance to the prospective student that the university will
be long-lived. Indeed, for this reason a university's current students may
have an interest in having the university pursue a fiscally conservative
policy by overcharging them a bit in the present (that is, profiting from
them by charging prices higher than necessary to finance the services
currently provided) in order to accumulate the financial reserves neces-
sary to guarantee that there is a high probability that the university will
remain a strong institution for the rest of the students' lives. In effect, the
students are buying insurance against loss of reputational capital.
One must wonder, however, whether these considerations are suffi-
ciently strong for most university graduates to provide a justification for
substantial endowment accumulation. Surely most students get the over-
whelming bulk of the benefits they will ever get from their university
during the years when they are actually enrolled-not after graduation
when they have other sources of reputational capital more closely associ-
ated with their work and other affiliations.
44 Another interpretation of alumni giving is that it involves repayment of an implicit loan.
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 22.
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B. Preserving Tradition
An alternative motivation for extreme fiscal conservatism in univer-
sities may derive from the special values that long life can have in an
educational institution.
For one thing, a long history can give an educational institution a wide-
spread reputation that is a valuable asset in attracting students, faculty,
and funds. Furthermore, since great age is a scarce attribute among edu-
cational institutions, it can become a source of social cachet; old colleges
and universities have an advantage in becoming exclusive ones. And
finally, part of what many students seek when they attend college (as
opposed, perhaps, to graduate school) is identification with tradition-
which may be embodied in part in an institution's physical plant, in part in
its established customs, and in part in the reputations of its graduates
throughout history. And tradition is in large part a product of age.
These products of age, which we shall refer to collectively as tradition,
are organization specific: if a college or university were to go bankrupt
and disappear, its value as a source of tradition would be lost-and the
same might be largely true if it were simply merged into another institu-
tion. The founding of other institutions to absorb the demand for educa-
tion would not make up for the destruction of this particular form of
organization-specific capital.
Tradition, in the sense described here, is to a degree analogous to
goodwill in a business firm. But there are two important differences. First,
the time necessary for a university to accumulate tradition, and the time
over which it earns returns, may be much longer than is characteristic of
ordinary business goodwill. Thus, major expenditures to protect it during
adversity may be appropriate. Second, business firms can sell equity
shares to finance the maintenance of goodwill during difficult periods,
while nonprofits are limited to using debt and retained earnings (endow-
ment) for this purpose. Debt, however, is poorly adapted for financing
risky investments in organization-specific capital (which by its nature
provides poor security). Thus, building an endowment may be a rational
way to protect tradition.
On the other hand, it is not clear that the value of tradition is so great,
or the threat of its erosion through temporary financial adversity so seri-
ous, that the accumulation of very large financial reserves is necessary to
protect it. It is difficult to find examples of once-prominent private educa-
tional institutions that have disappeared through financial hardship. Also,
it might plausibly be argued that tradition and reputational capital in gen-
eral are often best promoted and protected by current expenditures to
undertake research and train distinguished graduates and to build faculty
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and facilities for future education and research, rather than by accumulat-
ing funds.
IX. INSULATION FROM OUTSIDE DEMANDS
A large endowment may also serve to protect a university administra-
tion and faculty from the need to cater too closely to the desires of those
who ultimately provide the institution's income-whether they be stu-
dents, private donors, or the government.
One way in which the endowment can play this role is by serving as a
financial buffer. With a large endowment, a university's administration
and faculty can give expression to unpopular ideas without creating the
possibility of a short-term reduction in income that will immediately
threaten serious damage to the institution. If income from other sources
falls, the endowment is available to take up the slack for a time. That is,
the endowment prevents the university as a whole from being held hos-
tage in the short term by any particular source of current funding.
Alternatively, an endowment can be used simply to provide a source of
income to substitute, in whole or in part, for other sources of income
(such as governmental support) that might bring with them unwanted
pressures for conformity. That is, rather than maintaining the endowment
simply as a reserve fund to be used in case other income sources are
temporarily threatened, it can be built up to the point where its regular
income is sufficient to provide a substantial ongoing source of support.
A. The Historical Record
Historically, there is some evidence that endowments were first estab-
lished at some major universities with such aims in mind.45 Harvard, for
example, received 55 percent of its income from the Massachusetts legis-
lature between 1700 and 1800, and Yale likewise received substantial
subventions from the Connecticut legislature during this period. At that
time, neither university maintained a significant endowment fund. Not
surprisingly, both institutions found themselves under pressure to be at-
tentive to the legislatures' opinions on matters of educational policy
(which in the colonial period and the early years of the republic often
meant religious policy), and their public funding was cut at various times
when the universities resisted those pressures.
Public funding for both institutions came to an end in the first quarter of
4' The following material on Harvard and Yale is drawn from Ronald Story, The Forging
of an Aristocracy (1980); and Peter D. Hall, The Organization of American Culture, 1700-
1900: Private Institutions, Elites, and the Origins of American Nationality 51-53 (1984).
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the nineteenth century, evidently in considerable measure because the
religious views the universities espoused fell out of favor with the public.
(Both institutions were then clearly sectarian: Harvard was Unitarian,
while Yale was Congregationalist.) It was at this time that Harvard and
Yale began actively soliciting donations with which they built endow-
ments, the income from which accounted for more than 40 percent of total
income at both institutions by the 1840s. 46 These private sources of funds
were evidently successful in insulating both universities from serious
public influence in their affairs for the remainder of the nineteenth cen-
tury. On the other hand, both institutions fell under the strong influence of
the groups that contributed to their endowments. This was particularly
evident in the case of Harvard, whose administration came to be domi-
nated by Boston's business elite. The establishment of endowments at
Harvard and Yale therefore served to protect these institutions from the
vicissitudes of the political process. It did not, however, free them from
outside influence entirely but, rather, served to shift the source of that
influence.
B. Some Contrary Evidence
Although it seems clear that Harvard and Yale originally solicited en-
dowment funds as a replacement for public subventions, it does not
necessarily follow that an important motivation was to insulate the uni-
versities from a dependence on public resources that might make them
hostage to the whims of legislatures. An alternative view of the record is
that private grants, including endowment funds, are simply viewed by
universities as a substitute for public funds and are relied on only when,
and to the extent that, public funds are unavailable.47
The latter interpretation is supported by the experience of recent de-
cades, during which substantial public subventions have again become
available to private universities. If the universities were concerned that
public funding threatened their intellectual freedom, they would presum-
ably have increased their endowments proportionately as reliance on
public funding increased. Yet this has not occurred. As the proportion of
university budgets accounted for by public funds has increased, the ratio
of endowment to budget has decreased. Column 9 of Table 2 illustrates
this fact for Yale, where the ratio decreases steadily for the three decades
following the Second World War.
4 These figures are based on computations from Harvard's and Yale's annual financial
reports for the period.
47 Theory and cross-national empirical evidence presented by James, supra note 5, em-
phasizes the substitutability of public and private funding for education and identifies some
important factors influencing the extent of public support at any given time and place.
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In fact, as a crude approximation, it appears that universities have
maintained the proportion between endowment size and private income
(tuition and gifts) roughly constant-that is, there has been no accumula-
tion of endowment to correspond to that portion of university income that
comes from the government. Yale's accounts, for example, include sepa-
rate figures for income from the federal government (including grants,
contracts, and student aid) 8 for years since 1964; column 2 of Table 3
gives this governmental support as a fraction of the total university
budget. Column 4 of Table 3, in turn, gives the ratio between the univer-
sity's nongovernmental budget and its endowment. Comparing the latter
figures with those in column 9 of Table 2 shows that the ratio of non-
governmental income to endowment remained relatively constant from
1920 (when there was essentially no income from the federal government)
through the 1960s. (The ratio began to increase in the 1970s, though much
of this increase can be attributed to the poor performance of the stock
market during that period; in recent years the ratio has begun to decrease
again.)
C. A Buffer against Private Donors?
An alternative view, and one that is more consistent with the historical
pattern of behavior just reviewed, is that universities have accumulated
endowments, not to protect themselves from the pressures that come
from the government, but rather to put them less at the mercy of the
whims of private donors or even students. It is not easy to test this
hypothesis from the available record. One thing that argues against it,
however, is that private donors themselves seem so fond of contributing
to endowment. One strongly suspects, as discussed further below, that in
fact the accumulation of endowments is undertaken in substantial part in
deference to the desires of donors and not as a check on those desires.
D. The Policy Question
In short, it is not at all clear from the evidence that universities have
accumulated endowments in important part as a means of protecting in-
stitutional autonomy.
Moreover, from a normative perspective, the desirability of maintain-
ing endowments to assure institutional autonomy is quite ambiguous. The
appeal of such a policy depends on whether one thinks that more or less
responsiveness to the preferences of government, donors, and students
48 This figure does not include the tax revenues forgone by the federal government as a
consequence of the deductibility of private donations to the university under the personal
income tax.
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who pay tuition is desirable. On the one hand, the substantial institutional
autonomy that an endowment permits may help keep the maintenance of
culture and the pursuit of knowledge from being blown about unduly by
the shifting winds of ideology and interest; on the other hand, as Adam
Smith forcefully argued, it may provide an unfortunate opportunity for
irrelevance and sloth.a9
X. SUtBSIDIZING VALUES
A related, but slightly different, theory is that an endowment can serve
the present generation as a means of insuring that its values will be passed
on to the next generation. The values in question may be broad, such as
freedom of inquiry, a liberal education, or the production of useful knowl-
edge, or they may be narrower, such as the perpetuation of a particular
religious creed (Unitarianism in the case of nineteenth-century Harvard,
Congregationalism in the case of Yale) or the perpetuation of the influence
and mores of a commercial and social elite (both Yale and, conspicuously,
Harvard in the nineteenth century). In economic terms, one might say
that the present generation is seeking to subsidize value formation in the
next generation. The subsidy is not needed for reasons of ability to pay
since the next generation will presumably be more prosperous than the
present one. Rather, the subsidy is called for only if the current genera-
tion fears that some future generation will (mistakenly) esteem the
"right" values too little and will let the university that perpetuates those
values go to waste if the institution is set up simply on a pay-as-you-go
basis.
On the other hand, this rationale is subject to an objection similar to
that described above with respect to the intergenerational transfers ra-
tionale: a university might have a stronger effect on the values of succeed-
ing generations if its current funds were invested, not in stocks and bonds,
but rather in faculty, buildings, and a great tradition of research and
education. In any case, the normative appeal of this rationale of course
depends on one's view of the values being subsidized.
XI. THE PREFERENCES OF DONORS
The several rationales for endowment accumulation reviewed above all
involve an appeal to the long-run best interests of society and, particu-
larly, of students. That is, whether or not one finds any of these rationales
convincing, they all at least seek to explain endowment accumulation as a
device that might be chosen to advance social welfare in a principled way.
We turn now to several behavioral explanations for endowment accumu-
49 Adam Smith, 2 The Wealth of Nations 282-302 (E. Cannan ed. 1976).
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lation that involve no such social welfare argument but, rather, suggest
that endowments may be at least in part a consequence of self-interested
or short-sighted action by the individuals who support or manage univer-
sities.
To begin with, it is a truism that many donors restrict their gifts for use
as endowment, not to advance education and knowledge, but to purchase
a bit of personal immortality. Moreover, it is possible that universities
maintain substantial amounts of quasi endowment in part to appeal to the
same instincts that lead donors to restrict their gifts to true endowment.
For instance, some individuals, though prepared to leave their gifts unre-
stricted (or unprepared to undertake the formalities necessary to restrict
their gifts to endowment), may nevertheless be more willing to donate if
they believe that their gifts will be used for endowment or other capital
projects rather than being spent currently. By annually adding some frac-
tion of its unrestricted gift income to endowment rather than spending all
such income currently, a university can induce in donors some faith that
this belief is justified. If a university were to limit its endowment to funds
that are legally restricted to such use, it might receive fewer gifts in total,
and more that are formally restricted.5 ° In short, it may be that univer-
sities accumulate not just true endowment but also quasi endowment, at
least in part because that is simply an effective way to raise funds.
As a normative matter, respecting the wishes of donors does not in
general threaten efficiency. Others might prefer that donors spend their
money differently, but it is, after all, the donors' money. If we respect an
individual's right to spend his money as he wishes, in general, we should
also respect his decision to designate the purposes for which his gifts will
be used-at least so long as the recipients are agreeable as well. There is,
however, a potential inefficiency associated with restrictions on the use
of property, including invested funds, that extend beyond the life of the
donor. Over time, the donor's purposes may become much less valuable
than they appeared during the donor's lifetime, so that the donor, if he
were alive, would himself prefer, or could be persuaded or bargained
with, to divert the funds to another object. But, since the donor is no
longer around, the funds will remain locked into their original purpose.
5 1
50 One might think that a large endowment-and particularly a large accumulation of
unrestricted funds-would tend to discourage further donations since potential donors
might conclude that the university is already sufficiently prosperous. The reverse, however,
is sometimes argued: donors wish to participate in a permanent and conspicuously success-
ful venture-to help build a monument, even if it is only a hoard of negotiable securities;
thus, paradoxically, they are less likely to contribute to a university if it appears pressed for
funds.
51 Or, put differently, one cannot bargain over the allocation of property rights when
those rights belong to a dead person. Thus, the Coase Theorem does not apply here; the rule
of law matters, from the standpoint of efficiency, when it comes to restrictions that outlive
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If perpetual restrictions on the use of property were generally honored by
the law, there would thus be a tendency for an ever larger portion of
society's wealth to become trapped into outmoded uses. And it is the
preferences of the ignorant and short-sighted that would be most honored
in the long run.
It is presumably for these reasons that perpetual restrictions are gener-
ally unenforceable in law.52 Only gifts to charity are exempt, presumably
because charitable purposes are, by definition, considered generally bene-
ficial to society, and because there is an escape hatch in the doctrine of cy
pres, which allows courts to divert funds from their original purposes if
those purposes become clearly impracticable. Because, however, the
legal definition of charitable purposes is extremely broad, the doctrine of
cy pres is narrow, and the few individuals who have standing to bring a cy
pres action (the trustees and the attorney general) 53 have little incentive to
do so, there arguably remains substantial opportunity for donors to re-
strict gifts to educational institutions in ways that prove, over time, quite
inefficient.
In any event, endowment accumulation by nonprofits seems in many
cases to go well beyond the desires of donors. This is quite apparent in the
case of some types of nonprofit institutions other than universities. For
example, although very few of the large private foundations in the United
States received their funds as true endowment, burdened by their found-
ing donor with a restriction on expenditure of capital, most have chosen
to treat their funds as if they had.54 Since these institutions have already
received the one and only donation they will ever get, such behavior can
no more be ascribed to encouragement of further gifts than to compliance
with the intentions of the founder. Such examples suggest that the per-
sonal preferences or perspectives of those who manage the institutions in
question may be at least in part responsible for endowment policy.
To be sure, it has been argued that the investment decisions of non-
profits will necessarily reflect the preferences of donors for present versus
future consumption since donors have the option of contributing either
the owner of the property. See Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities
Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 Wash. U. L. Q. 723, 734-
37 (1986).
52 Not all would agree, however, that the existing restrictions on perpetual conditions
are either necessary or effective in preventing undesirable restraints on alienation. See
Richard Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64
Wash. U. L. Q. 667, 710-16 (1986).
" See Bogert, supra note 18.
14 John Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal and
State Policies, in Powell, ed., supra note 5, at 67, 80 n.24.
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currently or in the future, or of not contributing at all (or contributing to
another institution), and thus can constrain the choices made by those
who manage nonprofits. More particularly, it has been argued that
nonprofits will make investments that reflect the trade-off between pres-
ent and future returns that is available in the capital markets since donors
have the option of making a contribution currently or investing in the
capital markets and donating later.
This argument has some plausibility to the extent that it predicts that
donors will succeed in keeping nonprofits from spending to much cur-
rently and saving too little: to prevent that, donors can always delay
donation or restrict their donation for use as endowment. But it is not
convincing as a limitation on the ability of nonprofits to save more than
donors would prefer. For the argument to work in that case, one must
assume, among other things, that the nonprofit involved has no market
power in the market for donations, which is in general implausible. When,
for example, Harvard solicits contributions from Harvard graduates, they
are unlikely to feel that a contribution to Yale is a perfect substitute, and
thus they are unlikely to refuse to contribute to Harvard altogether simply
because they feel that Harvard is accumulating too much of its income
and spending too little currently.
A donor can, of course, make a contribution subject to the restriction
that it be spent currently, but that would generally be a meaningless
restriction since the institution can simply retain other funds in its place.
And to write an enforceable contract sufficient to prevent such substitu-
tion in a large and financially complex institution such as a university
would in most cases be infeasible.
Consequently, those who manage nonprofits presumably have some
discretion concerning their institutions' saving behavior, and their incen-
tives deserve scrutiny.
XII. PREFERENCES OF ADMINISTRATORS AND FACULTY
Extreme fiscal conservatism may serve the personal interests of a uni-
versity's faculty and administrators. These individuals have an important
degree of control over a university. That control is not, however, accom-
panied by all the incidents of full ownership; in particular, faculty and
staff do not have the right to appropriate directly the institution's net
earnings. There are, however, indirect ways in which to extract profits.
One, of course, is through perquisites, such as a light work load, a pleas-
" Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms and Investment Deci-
sions, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 101, 115-17 (1985).
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ant physical environment, or interesting students. Another is by purchas-
ing job security. Faculty and administrators, when faced with a trade-off
between using current surpluses to increase the present level of services
or, alternatively, to build reserves that will help make their jobs secure
in the future, may well be inclined toward the latter; the former course
will benefit primarily the students and the new faculty who are hired for
the expanded programs, while the latter course will have benefits more
closely confined to the current faculty alone. This is not to suggest that
faculty and administrators self-consciously seek to exploit their univer-
sities through the manipulation of endowment policy. It is simply to note
that the importance of stability and continuity in the life of an educational
institution may have unusual salience to its employees.
Other types of large nonprofit corporations have shown such a ten-
dency toward excessive accumulation of assets. For example, there is
strong evidence that nonprofit hospitals have been substantially over-
capitalized in recent years.5 6 Mutual insurance companies, in turn, have
systematically tended to build up, through retained profits, financial re-
serves well in excess of those necessary to serve their current policy-
holders. 58 And, of course, there are some famous historical precedents
as well: the substantial accumulated wealth of Buddhist monasteries in
T'ang Dynasty China (in the year 845), and of Christian monasteries in
sixteenth-century England, was expropriated by the state in part, at least,
out of a feeling that this wealth had become excessive relative to the
services that the monasteries provided to society.
59
Even for-profit firms may exhibit such behavior. For example, it has
been argued that the relatively low debt-equity ratios that have character-
ized widely held U.S. business corporations reflect, in part, the desire of
corporate managers to pursue the survival of their corporations and their
careers, even at the expense of profitability, by creating job security for
56 See the findings reported in Senate Report No. 93-1285, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Congressional and Administrative News, at 7842, 7878-79; Senate Report No. 96-96, re-
printed in 1979 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, at 1306, 1358.
17 Mutual insurance companies are not, strictly speaking, nonprofit firms but, rather, are a
variety of consumer cooperative. Yet, since they first appeared in the 1840s, they have
operated like pure managerial or "entrepreneurial" nonprofits over which the patrons
(policyholders) exercise no meaningful control. See Henry Hansmann, The Organization of
Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock, I J. L. Econ., & Org. 125 (1985).
" John Hetherington, Fact v. Fiction: Who Owns Mutual Insurance Companies? 1969
Wisc. L. Rev. 1068.
59 Kenneth Ch'en, The Economic Background of the Hui-ch'ang Suppression of Bud-
dhism, 19 Harv. J. Asiatic Stud. 67 (1956); J. D. Mackie, The Early Tudors, 1485-1558, at
370-79, 396-401 (1952).
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themselves through excessive accumulation of capital that can provide a
substantial cushion against misfortune. 60
On the other hand, endowment accumulation at major universities
seems to exceed substantially that which could reasonably serve the secu-
rity interests of present faculty, whose time horizon in this respect-
determined by the time they can expect to remain in their current univer-
sity's employ-is on average probably no more than about twenty years.
Casual empiricism, moreover, suggests that university faculty are far
from unanimous in supporting conservative endowment policies, often
preferring instead an increase in spending on current programs.
XIII. THE PECULIAR PERSPECTIVE OF TRUSTEES
A further explanation for endowment accumulation may lie in the par-
ticular perspective that university trustees bring to their office.
The trustees of universities, who generally come from the business
world rather than the academic world, are often in a poor position to
exercise meaningful oversight over the actual operations of the institu-
tion. The management of the endowment, on the other hand, is closer to
their areas of professional expertise. This may help explain the pattern
that is commonly observed-namely, that the trustees tend to focus a
disproportionate amount of their attention on the endowment and make
its preservation or growth a special priority. This tendency may be rein-
forced by the fact that the size and growth of the endowment is a tangible
and easily measured thing, whereas many of a university's other objec-
tives are more difficult to define and much less immediately observable,
making the university's success in meeting those objectives harder to
measure. Furthermore, in the business world, dollar figures are used as a
measure of the success of an institution. It may be that, consciously or
unconsciously, university trustees tend to focus on the size of the univer-
sity's retained earnings (that is, its endowment) as a measure of the suc-
cess of the management of the institution. Indeed, rather than simply
viewing the endowment as a potential means for improving the univer-
sity's output of education and research, to some extent trustees may,
conversely, tend to view the university's academic activities as a con-
straint on, or a means to, the autonomous objective of having a large and
growing endowment. In this vein, one sometimes has the sense that uni-
versities compete among themselves to have the largest endowment, as if
60 See, for example, Gordon Donaldson & Jay Lorsch, Decision Making at the Top: The
Shaping of Strategic Direction (1983).
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accumulating a large endowment were in itself an important measure of
institutional success. And it is a form of competition that has a Veblenian
appearance, as if the universities were engaging in conspicuous consump-
tion (or, what is the same thing here, conspicuous nonproduction)-since
an endowment, in a sense, represents accumulated income that the uni-
versity has been able to afford not to spend on education and research.
Some evidence that the maintenance of an endowment is often viewed
as an objective in its own right, rather than simply as a means to an end,
comes from the infrequency with which endowment policy seems to be
connected even to a university's other investment programs. For ex-
ample, it would seem logical for a university to compare the return it can
get on the securities in its endowment with the return it can get, in terms
of both services and reduced future expenditures, from investment in its
own physical plant and then seek to allocate funds between endowment
and physical plant in a fashion that equates these returns at the margin.
Yet endowment policy is rarely discussed in these terms.61
In any event, whether or not trustees' concern with endowment ac-
cumulation goes to the extreme of making the size of the endowment an
end in itself, it is frequently observed that they seem exceptionally risk
averse in their approach to university finances. Perhaps the reason for this
is that, for the reasons of expertise mentioned above, they feel themselves
likely to take the blame if the institution fails financially, while others are
likely to get the credit if it succeeds academically. Consequently, large
financial reserves are a source of substantial comfort to them.
Such a tendency toward extreme financial conservatism, or even mak-
ing the endowment an end in itself, may be reinforced by the fact that the
members of the board of directors of many nonprofit corporations, includ-
ing universities, are commonly referred to as "trustees." In fact, they are
not trustees in the strict sense. In particular, they are not, as the term
might suggest in this context, trustees of a charitable trust and bound by
the rules that govern such trustees. Rather, their role and their obligations
are in most respects similar to those of the members of the board of
directors of a business corporation, 62 and they could-and perhaps
should-simply be termed "directors" rather than "trustees."
61 Fama & Jensen, supra note 55, at 116 reason (a priori) that "the opportunity costs
signalled by endowment portfolio investments lead the internal agents of non-profits to
evaluate cost saving capital projects according to the same maximum wealth or market value
rule which is optimal for [business] corporations." But there is little evidence that this
theoretical conclusion is reflected in actual practice.
62 See Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses and Mis-
sionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974); American Bar Association, Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act § 8.30(e) (1987).
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Nevertheless, the term "trustee" has become conventional for the
members of university boards of directors. And the term may itself have
some influence on the behavior of these boards. For the term "trustee" is
generally applied to individuals who are entrusted to look after a fund of
money-and often a fund of money that is subject to restrictions limiting
the amount of the principal, if any, that may be spent currently. Thus, if
a university trustee asks herself what she is a "trustee" of, she might
naturally conclude that, whatever else is involved, she is a trustee of the
endowment fund and that it follows that she has a special responsibility to
make certain that the fund is retained intact.
XIV. CUSTOM AND HABIT
Finally, it is possible that universities seek to build or maintain endow-
ments in considerable part simply out of custom, habit, or tradition. Hav-
ing built large endowments in the nineteenth century-originally, per-
haps, because donations were needed to replace lost government funds,
because donors preferred giving in the form of endowment, and because
the lumpy character of donations made spending them over a prolonged
period rational in any event-the older universities may simply have
become accustomed to having them and may be perpetuating the practice
of maintaining or increasing them largely as a tradition that merely lingers
on without a well thought-out modern rationale. And younger univer-
sities, in turn, may tend simply to adopt endowment policies that mimic
those of the older and more illustrious institutions.
XV. CONCLUSION
The argument that has been offered most frequently in recent years to
explain the accumulation of endowments-that they are a means to in-
tergenerational equity-is unpersuasive. More compelling reasons to ac-
cumulate endowments are that they serve as a financial buffer against
periods of financial adversity, that they help to insure the long-run sur-
vival of the institution's reputational capital, that they protect the institu-
tion's intellectual freedom, and that they assist in passing on values prized
by the present generation. It is not clear, however, that these are today
the reasons why endowments are accumulated. Nor is it clear that the
sizes of existing endowments, and the ways in which they are managed,
are well chosen to serve these goals. In particular, prevailing endowment
spending rules seem inconsistent with most of these objectives.
We cannot say, from the arguments and evidence surveyed here, that
the endowments of the major private universities today are either too big
or too small. It does appear, however, that surprisingly little thought has
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been devoted to the purposes for which endowments are maintained and
that, as a consequence, their rate of accumulation and the pattern of
spending from their income have been managed without much attention to
the ultimate objectives of the institutions that hold them.
Given the poor state of our understanding, it would be premature to
propose changes in the law governing endowment accumulation and, in
particular, to propose measures to limit the discretion of universities to
accumulate large endowments. Moreover, the importance of adopting
such restrictions is lessened by the fact that even substantially excessive
endowment building may lead to only a limited amount of waste from a
social welfare standpoint. Because funds that a university devotes to en-
dowment are today typically invested in market securities, they are at
least being used productively.63 Indeed, efforts to limit endowment ac-
cumulation might in part have the effect of diverting universities toward
other, less efficient forms of accumulation (for example, useless facilities
or excessive esoteric research by faculty) or toward unproductive current
spending.
Nevertheless, there are costs associated with excessive endowment
accumulation; funds may be diverted from more productive uses either
within or without the institution. The mere potential to adopt legislation
restricting endowment accumulation-made more salient by the recent
enactment of such legislation in other countries and by the enactment in
this country of restrictions on accumulation by private foundations-may
therefore be a useful stimulus to universities and other endowed institu-
tions to satisfy themselves and others that their policies toward endow-
ment accumulation are reasonable in light of the ends to which their
institutions are dedicated.
APPENDIX
INTERGENERATIONAL WEALTH TRANSFERS THROUGH ENDOWMENT ACCUMULATION
To understand the intergenerational efficiency of alternative endowment spend-
ing rules, it helps to consider some simple models.
No Future Gifts, Zero Discount Rate. To begin with, let us ignore exter-
nalities, such as the social benefits of university research, and assume that the
university's objective is simply to maximize the undiscounted sum of utilities of
all future generations of students at the university (that is, we shall assume a zero
63 This is in contrast, for example, to the situation with the Buddhist monasteries in Tang
Dynasty China, which accumulated a large fraction the nation's valuable metals (often in the
form of images), thus removing them from the economy and creating a strong incentive for
expropriation by the state. See Ch'en, supra note 59.
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rate of time discount). Let us also assume that the size of the university's student
body remains constant, that the amount of education consumed by each genera-
tion of students remains constant, and that there is no risk. Then the utility
enjoyed by a given generation of students will just be a function of their after-
tuition income, and we can represent the utility of a typical student in year t as
U, = U(Yt - C, + St), (Al)
where Y, is the student's income at time t, Ct is the cost to the university of
educating a student, and S, is the per-student subsidy from the endowment. (It
might, in fact, be most sensible here to consider Y, as reflecting the student's
parents' income or the present value of the student's future income.) Take the
simple case in which the endowment per student has an initial value at time 0 of
E0, to which no further gifts are added. Assume that real student income grows at
an exponential rate of g, that real costs increase at the rate c, and that the real rate
of return on the endowment is r.
Will intergenerational equity be maximized by spending an equal amount-
namely, rE0 , the real return on the endowment-each period? With such a policy,
we can rewrite (1) as
U, = U(Yoe gt - Coec + rEo). (A2)
This will maximize total utility only if reducing (or increasing) endowment spend-
ing by an amount Q in one period (say, period 0) and spending the resulting
increase (or decrease) in accumulated endowment, Qe rl, in a later period t will not
increase total utility. That is, total utility will be maximized with equal spending
out of endowment in each period only if
d [U(Yo - Co + rEo - Q) + U(Yoe
t  Coec + rE0 + Qer)] = 0 (A3)
for all t, where the derivative is evaluated at Q - 0. Assuming, for illustration, a
logarithmic utility function, (3) is equivalent to
Yo(e" - est) - Co(e rt - ect) + rEo(ert - 1) = 0. (A4)
So long as the parameters Y0, C0 , E0 , and r all take positive values, there are no
values of the parameters for which this condition is met for all values of t and,
thus, no circumstances under which the currently conventional rule calling for
spending annually the real return on existing endowment is appropriate in this
model. (Viewed as a function of t, the left-hand side of [4] has only a finite number
of roots for any given set of positive values for the parameters, and hence there
are at most a finite number of values of t for which [4] is satisfied.) Rather, if the
left-hand side of (4) is negative, as might be the case if r is roughly equal to g and if
c is much smaller than r, then an endowment spending rule that calls for a higher
rate of current expenditure is appropriate, and the converse is true if the left-hand
side of (4) is positive, as might be the case if r is substantially larger than g but
roughly equal to c.
A More General Model. Let us generalize the model above by dropping the
restrictive assumption that the rate of discount is zero and, instead, introducing a
discount rate of i. Also, let us take into account the gift income G, that is expected
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in each future year t. In particular, let us assume that gift income is expected to
grow at a rate s, so that G, = Goes. Then the left-hand side of (3) becomes
d [U(Yo - Co + rEo + Go - Q)
dQ (AS)+ e-'tU(Yoe t - Coect + rEo + Goevt + Qert)].
Again using a logarithmic utility function, the sign of (5) will be the same as the
sign of
Yo[e (r- i~t _ eg'] - Co[e(r- Ot - e t] + rEo[e(r- 0t - 1] + Go[e(r- t - evt]. (A6)
Only if the value of (6) is positive would welfare be enhanced by adding a portion
of gift income to endowment rather than spending it all currently. As in the case of
(4), (6) could in fact be positive or negative, depending on the particular values
taken by the parameters. It will tend to be positive if i is small relative to r and if c
is large relative to v and g, and it will tend to be negative in the reverse circum-
stances.
